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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FREED FINANCE COMPNAY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
W. J. PREECE, WILLIAM V.
PREE CE and PREECE
MOTOR, INC., a corporation,
Defendants,
WILLIAM V. PREECE,
Defendant and Appelant.

Case No. 9858

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STAITEMENIT OF THE KIND ·OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff,
Freed Finance Company, a corporation, against
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, which was licensed to sell new 1and used automobiles under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, for amounts
due under the terms and conditions of the purchase
of certain conditional sale con tracts for the sale
of automobiles from said Preece Motor, Inc.
Also against the individual defendants, W. J.
Preece and William V. Preece, officers of Preece
Motor, Inc., a corporation, under the terms and
1
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conditions of an unconditional written guaranty
to Freed Finance Company, guaranteeing the payment of any and all sums due and owing from
Preece Motor, Inc. to Freed Finance Company.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'T
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, and W. J.
Preece, an individual defendant, by their counsel,
stipulated in open court that if proof were adduced,
$10,000.00 would be found to be due and owing
Freed Finance Company from Preece Motor, Inc. ;
that W. J. Preece, under and by virtue of said
guaranty of the obligations of Preece Motor, Inc.
to Freed Finance would be owing $10,000.00. Preece
Mdtor, Inc. and W. J. Preece further stipulated that
judgment could be entered against each of them
for the amount of $10,000.00.
Wm. V. Preece, by his attorney, entered into
a written stipla:tion with the attorneys for Freed
Finance Company that if said Freed Finance Company adduced evidence in support of the allegations
of its complaint, it could prove that Preece Motor
Inc. was indebted in the sum of $10,000.00 to Freed
Finance Company as of February 29, 1960. By
virtue of said stipulation, judgment was entered
against Wm. V. Preece in the sum of $10,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON A:PPEAL
'The defendant and appellant, William V.
2
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Preece, seeks reversal of the judgment entered
against him, and dismissal of the action as against
him. This respondent and plaintiff seeks an affirm-:ance of said judgment of $10,000.0Q as entered by
the lower court in favor of Freed Finance Company
as against William V. Preece.
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
Freed Finance Company is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of Utah, and was doing business
in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the purchasing of notes
and conditional sales contracts. (T. 75-76) That
Preece Motor, Inc., prior to February, 1960, was
engaged in the automobile business at Layton, Utah,
in the selling of new and used automobiles. That
Freed Finance Company was doing business with
them in purchasing contracts. That is, conditional
sale contracts in which the sU!bject matter thereof
was ·the sale of motor vehicles on the installment
plan. It was doing business with them prior to 1960
as a partnership, tha:t is, W. J. Preece and William
V. Preece, doing business under the firm name and
style of Preece Motor Co. That subsequent thereto,
the assets of the partnership were transferred to
a corporation known as Preece Motor, Inc., and that
Preece Motor, Inc. did business as had been previously done by the partnership.
In February, 1960, M. R. Weiler, Vice Presi3
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dent of Freed Finance Company, had a conversation with W. J. Preece, in which he stated that
in order to continue business with the Preece Motor
Inc., that the Freeds would h'ave to have the
personal endorsement of W. J. and William V.
Preece, and that if this could not be done, it would
be necessary to take over the company and close it
out. That is, that they would not continue to do
business with Preece Mdtor Inc., (T. 77-78) Mr.
Weller gave to Mr. Preece Exhibit 1, which is the
guaranty agreement.
1

At the time Exhibit 1 (guaranty agreement)
was given to W. J. Preece, there was filled in on
the agreement the name of the company, the signatures on the financial statement, and all of the
typewritten information was set forth therein. W.
J. Preece, President, had also signed on Exhibit 1
for Preece Motor, Incorporated ('Tr. 78, 79). There
is no question that Mr. Weiler did not see either of
the defendants, W. J. Preece or Wm. V. Preece,
sign the document known as Exhibit 1, which is
the guaranty agreement ( Tr. 80) . W. J. Preece
and Wm. V. Preece did business under the firm name
and style of Preece Motor Company as a partnership until 1959. In February of 1959, the assets of
the partnership were then transferred to the corporation of Preece Motor, Incorporated, one of the defendants herein (Tr. 82). The defendants, W. J.
4
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Preece and Wm. V. Preece took stock in the corporation in consideration of the assets of the partnership to the corporation of about fifty-fifty ('Tr. 83).
W. J. Preece testified that his signature appears on
Exhibit 1 in the guaranty part as the President
of Preece Motor, Incorporated, and that he signed
the same ( Tr. 83).
W. J. Preece testified that Mr. Weiler told
him that it was necessary to have his signature as
a guarantee, as well as his father's, and that without them they would refuse to do business with
Preece Motor, Incorporated; that is, it was necessary to have the signatures of W. J. Preece and
Wm. V. Preece, the former partners (Tr. 83). W.
J. Preece testified that he signed his name on the
back of Exhibit 1 on the guaranty part. That he also
signed his father's name, Wm. V. Preece, on the
same side. Mr. Preece testified that, thinking he
had a power of attorney, he signed his father's name.
That he executed Exhibit 1, that is, his father's signature, Wm. V. Preece, by virtue of a power of
attorney (Tr. 84). Exhibit 2-P (Tr. 85, 86) was
a power of attorney, as testified to by W. J. Preece
as executed by W m. V. Preece.
It was the only intent of the plaintiff to ascertain the truth and factual situation in this matter and, therefore, the following questions by the
attorney for Freed Finance Company:
5
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Q.

A.

(By Mr. Callister) Now am I to understand, Mr. Preece, that this power of attourney was to terminate upon your
father's return from his mission?
(By W. J. Preece) Well, Mr. Callister,
actually if you say do I understand it
tha!t way, my answer is no. * * * (Tr.
91 ) . (Italics ours)

Mr. Weiler had asked W. J. Preece to get his father's
signature on the guaranty (Tr. 9'2). Exhibit 1, the
guaranty, was given to Mr. Weiler and nothing
was said 'a!bout the fact that the signature was his
father's by virtue of a power of attorney (Tr. 92,
93) . We quote the following ('Tr. 9'3) :
Q. Now if I understand you, you want us
'to believe that at the time you signed it
that you thought you had a power of attorney but now that since you have had
further thought on the matter, it is your
impression that the power of attorney
was to terminate upon your father's return, is that right?
A. No, that is not exactly right.
We quote the following with regard to the
power of attorney, Exnibit 2-P (Tr. 94):
Q. (By Mr. Callilster) Well, did he indicate
to you the time in which this power of
a!ttorney would exist, was there anything
said as to that?
A. (By W. J. Preece) No.

****
Q.

(By Mr. Callister) Well then, Mr. Preece,
6
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it is a fact, isn't it, that you have testified that it was given to you for the
duration of the absence from the states
or the country by your father, was that
right, and he so advised?
A. (By W. J. Preece) No, sir, he didn't. This
is three times I have told you that. (Italics
ours)
Mr. Weiler informed W. J. Preece that he would
not continue to give credit to the corporation unless
Exhibit 1 was signed by him and his father, Wm. V.
Preece (Tr. 95).
Wm. V. Preece, appellant, testified as follows
(Tr. 102) :
Q. Well now, just tell us whether or not you
had a conversation with him as to the
time limlit of the power of attorney?
A. I don't remember any conversation to
that effect.
We quote the following ( Tr. 103) :
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece (W. V. Preece),
take your time and think back. For you
to have an understanding that this was
only to be in force and effect during your
absence while on a mission, wasn't there
something said between you and your
son with regard to that subject matter?

A. I don't think there was, I don't remember.
Q. Then how did you get the understanding
as you said, you said there was an understanding that this wa:s only to prevail,
7
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that is the power of attorney, while you
were absent from the States?
A.

Well, that was my understanding in my
own thinking. There was never no agreement to that effect. We never did have
no conversation on it, as I remember.
(Italics ours)

Q.

And there was no agreement to th'at effect?

A.

Not as I remember.

We further quote (Tr. 104) :
Q. Well, now, 1surely, Mr. Preece (W. V.
Preece) , didn't you have some understanding as you state 'that this was only
to last for the period of your mission?
A.

There was no conversation to that effect.

Q.

Well now, Mr. Preece, have you ever taken any ~action or taken any steps to terminate or to bring to an end this power of
attorney, proposed Exhibit 2?
No sir.

A.

We further quote ('Tr. 109) :

Q.

(By Mr. Callister) 'Then if I understand
you correctly, at no 'time did you ever
have any conversation with your son with
respect to the length of time which this
power of attorney would be in effect?

A.

(By Wm. V. Preece) That is correct.

8
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A'RGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RE IS SUFFI'CIE'N·T EVIDEN'CE IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COUR'T'S FINDING AND CONC:UUSION AND JUDGMENT.
1

'This court has announced certain cardin,a.l rules
that must be kept in mind with respect to the soundn~ss of the trial court's conclusion and judgment.
These are that the judgment is endowed with a
presumption of validity; that the party attacking
it has the 'burden of ~affirmatively showing tha!t it
is in error; and that the evidence and all inferences
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom
must be viewed in the light most favorable _to it.
Cheney vs. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86. Charlton vs. Hackett.
360 ·P.2d 176.
There is 'ample and sufficient evidence in the
record to ~support the trial court's finding that W.
J. Preece, by virtue of a power of attorney from
Wm. V. Preece, appellant herein, affixed the name
of Wm. V. Preece to the guaranty ( Exhihi t 1).
W. J. Preece, the son, testified that Mr. Weiler
told him that it was necessary to have his signature
'as a guarantee, as well as his father's, and that
without them they would refuse to do business with
Preece Mo'tor, Incorporated ; that is, it was necessary to have the signatures df W. J. Preece and Wm.
V. Preece, the former partners ('Tr. 83). W. J.
9
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Preece testified that he signed his name on the back
of Exhibit 1 on the guaranty part. That he also
signed hi's f'ather's name, Wm. V. Preece, on the
same side. Mr. Preece testified that, thinking he had
a power of a!ttorney, he signed his father's name.
That he executed Exhibit 1, that is his father's signature, Wm. V. Preece, by virtue of a power of
attorney CTr. 84). Exhibit 2-P (Tr. 85, 86) was
a power of attorney, 'as testified to by W. J. Preece
aJs executed by Wm. V. Pree·ce.
No 'action or steps were ever 'taken 'by Wm. V.
Preece to terminate or bring to an end the power of
attorney (Ex. 2) fTr. 104).
We are taking the liberty df repeating, for the
convenience of the court, excerpts of the tes'timony
In support of the judgment.

Q.

(By Mr. Callister) Now am I to understand, Mr. Preece, that this power of
attorney was to terminate upon your
faJther's return from his mission?

A.

(By W. J. Preece) Well, Mr. Callister,
actually if you say do I understand it
that way, my answer is no. * * * ('Tr.
91).

We quote the following ('Tr. 93):
1

Q.

Now if I understand you, you want us
to believe that at the time you signed it
10
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that you thought you had a power of
attorney but now that since you have
had further thought on 'the matter, it is
your impression that the power of attorney was to terminate upon your
fiather's return, is that right?
A.

No, that is not exa'ctly right.

We quote the following with regard to the
power of attorney, Exhibit 2-P, (Tr. 94):
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Well, did he indicate
'to you the time in which this power of
attorney would exist, was there anything
said as to tha;t?
A.

(ByW. J. Preece) No.

* * * *
Q.

(By Mr. Callister) Well then, Mr. Preece,
it is a fact, isn't it, tha:t you have testified that it was given to you for the duration of the alJsence from the states or
the country by your father, was that
right, and he so advised?

A.

(By W. J. Preece) No, sir, he didn't. This
is three times I have told you th'at.

Mr. Weiler informed W. J. Preece thaJt he
would not continue to give credit to the corporation
unless Exhi!bit 1 was signed by him and his father,
Wm. V. Preece ('Tr. 95).
Wm. V. Preece testified as follows (Tr. 102):
11
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Q.

Well now, just tell us whether or not you
had a conversation with him as to the
time limit of the power of attorney?

A.

I don't remember any conversation to
that effect.

We quote the :following (Tr. 103) :
Q. Well now, Mr. Preece, take your time
and think back. For you to have an understanding tha:t this was only to be in force
and effect during your absence while on
a mission, wasn't there something said
between you and your son with regard
to that subject matter?
A.

I don't think there was, I don't remember.

Q.

Then how did you get the understanding
as you said, you said there was an understanding that this was only to prevail,
that is the power of attorney, while you
were absent from the States?

A.

Well, that was my understanding in my
own think'ing. There was never no agreement to that effect. We never did have
no conversation on it, as I remember.

Q.

And there was no agreement to that effect?

A.

Not as I remember.

We further quote (Tr. 104):

Q.

Well, now, surely, Mr. Preece, didn't you
have some understanding as you state
that this was only to last for the period
of your mission?
12
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A.

There was no conversation to that effect.

Q.

Well now, Mr. Preece, have you ever ·taken any action or taken any steps to terminate or to bring to an end this power
of attorney, proposed Exhibit 2?

A.

No, sir.

We further quote (Tr. 109):
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Then if I unde~stand
you correctly, at no time did you ever
have any conversation with your son with
respect to the length of time which this
power of attorney would be in effect?
A.

(By Wm. V. Preece) That is correct.

From the foregoing there is no question that
the judgment entered by the trial court finds support. In a law a;cti'on ~the question on appeal is not
whether the evidence would have supported a judgment in favor of appellant, but whether the judgment entered by the tri,al court finds support in the
evidence. Green vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 284 P.·2d 69'5.
The Supreme Court will not redetermine facts
found by the fact finder in a lower court of law cases
if, in the light most favorable to the respondent,
the evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings.
Gibbons and Reed Co. vs. Guthrie, '256 P.2d 706.
On appeal from the judgment of the court try13
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ing facts, question for Supreme Court is, not which
party should be believed, but whether there is evidence directly or inferentially supporting trial
court's decision, which must be upheld, if inferences
supporting lower court's conclusions on probabilities
of circumstantial evidence may be drawn therefrom,
though Supreme Court might have stressed inferences adverse to such conclusion had it tried case.
- Lym v. Thompson, 1'84 P.2d 667, 112 Utah 24.
'The review of the Supreme Court in law cases
is limited to the determination of whether or not
there is competent evidence to support the judgment
of the trial court. - Dahnken v. George Romney
& Sons Co., 184 P.2d 211, 111 Utah 471.
POINT II.
W. J. PREECE ACTED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS
OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY IN EXECUTING
THE GUARANTY, AND THE POWER OF-ATTORNEY
HAD NEVER BEEN TERMINATEU AND WAS IN
FULL FO'R'CE AND EFFE CT AT THE TIME OF THE
EXECUTION OF THE WRITTEN GUARANTY.
1

Questions concerning agents holding powers of
attorney, that is, concerning attorneys in fact, are
not substantially and basically different from those
pertaining to agents generally, 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Page
434, Section 2'4.
The power of attorney, Exhibit 1, is the broadest type of power of attorney that could be drawn.
14
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It, without question, authorizes the execution of
the written guaranty by W. J. Preece.
Moreover, the principal is bound when
the agent and a third person have acted in
regard to an ob'j ect permitted in he power
granted, even though the mode of action is
open to question, and the court, upon a critical
examination of 'the language used, might be
of the opinion that a different construction
would be more correct. If the authorization
is 1ambiguous because of facts of which the
agent has no notice, he has authority to act
in accordance with what he reasonably believes to be the intent of the principal, although this is contrary to the principal's actual intent; if the agent should realize its
ambiguity, his authority, except in the case
of an emergency, is only to act in accordance
with the principal's intent. The rule thus
~tated p}aces upon the principal the burden
of reasonable mistakes made by the agent in
the interpretation of his authorization caused
by facts of which the agent has no notice.
2 AM. Jur. 35, § 3'3. See cases cited.
The execution of ExHibit 1, was within the
scope of the power of attorney.
The relation of principal and agent can be
terminated only by the act or agreement of the
parties to the agency, or by oper~aJtion of law. 3 Am.
Jur. 2d, Page 440, Section 3'4. See cases cited.
The burden of proving the termin'ation of an
agency is on the principal, and once established, the
agency, if the termination is not shown, i,s presumed
to continue. Exchange State Bank v. Occident Eleva15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tor Company, 24 P.2d 130. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Page 706,

Section 348. See cases cited.
When the agency has once been shown to have
existed, the relation will be presumed to have continued, in the absence of anything to show its termination; and the burden of proving a revocation or
other termination of an agency is on the party asserting it. 3 A·m. Jur. 2d, Page 440, Section 34. See
cases cited.
In the case before this Honorable Court, there
was no specified time for the duration of the power
of 1atorney; from the facts and circumstances in
this case there was no conversation between the
parties as to its termination date; therefore, it
would be presumed to have continued to be in force
and effect until terminaJted by the principal.
In view of the fact that the power of tattorney
did not have an expiration date, and that there was
no agreement between the principal and agent 1as
to its termination, that the trial court rightfully
concluded that it was in force and effect until such
time as i't was terminated by the principal. The son,
W. J. Preece, testified very emphatically that at the
time he executed the guaranty, Ex. 1, inserting his
father's name, he did so, thinking he h!ad the right
to do so by virtue of the power of attorney.
This guaranty was accepted by the plaintiff
and respondent in good faith, and based upon the
16
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guaranty, extended credit to the Preece Motor Company. If it had not received the guaranty as executed, it would not have extended credit, as the record
shows. Relying upon the gU!aranty agreement, the
plaintif and respondent extended credit, and as a
result thereof suffered a loss in excess of $10,000.00.
The father, Wm. V. Preece, was a substantial owner of the corporation, and by the extension of credit
to the corpo:rtation had the possibility of being benefited by the same.
It would seem to us that it would be outrageous
to permit the appellant, Wm. V. Preece, to avoid
this obligation under the facts and circumstances
in ~this case. Freed Finance Company was an innocent party to the transaction, and based upon the
document as presented to it, extended credit.
It is hard to believe that W. J. Preece would,
without authority and with intent to deceive 'and
defraud, forge his father's signature to a document. Therefore, W. J. Preece no doubt believed
honestly and sincerely that he had the power and
authority to execute the sam·e for 1and on behalf of
his father, under and by virtue of the power of
attorney. If he, W. J. Preece, believed it was still
in force and effect, there ·apparently was no termination date 'agreed upon and it was to remain in
force and effect until terminated.
It must be remembered that the father and the
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

son, Wm. V. Preece and W. J. Preece, respectively,
were engaged in the au to mobile business and at
the time in question were operating it under a corporate entity, having transferred their partnership
interests to the corporation.
The Utah cases cited by the appellant on page
twenty of his brief do not apply to the factual situation in this case.
The power of attorney specifically provides
that it is to be in respect to all rna tters of 'any nature
whatsoever in which he, Wm. V. Preece, may be
interested or concerned.
Wm. V. Preece had a very substantial interest
in the business of the corporation, being a large
stockholder. The execution of Exhibit 1 was certainly for his benefit as a stockholder. Wm. V. Preece
'admitted that there was never any conversation
with his son as to the time limit of the power of
attorney fTr. 39). 'This negative, without question,
the implication that Wm. V. Preece now tries to
introduce into this case, that is, that it was his
intent that it should only apply while he was on
his mission. That is, that it was to terminate wlien
he returned from his mission. This was not conveyed to his son. W. V. 'Preece testified ('Tr. 103)
that there was no a'greement to the effect that the
power of attorney was only to prevail while he,
W. V. Preece, was absent from the states. This,
18
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wilthout question, disposes of the appellant's argument in his 'brief that it was the 'intent that the
power of attorney was only to be in force during
his absence from the states while on his mission. W.
J. Preece ('Tr. 93), in answer to counsel's question
tha!t the power df attorney was given for the duration
of the absence from the state or the country by
his father, and th!a:t his father so advised him, stated
very emphatically: "No, sir, he didn't. This is three
times I have told you that".
Under the testimony as we have set forth in
this brief, could it be said that the son, W. J. Preece,
was told that the duration was only for the mission,
and that it should only be exercised during his
father's absence from the states? 'The answer is,
of course, no. We feel that it would be a misC'arriage
of justice to now permit the father, who was a substantial stockholder of the corporation, ljust because
there is now a loss, to repudiate a power of attorney given without any conversation as to its
duration; no time fixed in the power of attorney
for its termination; and the son, acting in accordance
with his understanding of the power of aJttorney,
to now have it repudiated?
Without question, the father, Wm. V. Preece,
did not intrdouce any evidence whatsoever, or did
he susta:in the proof that there was a termination
date, or that it was an agreement between the par19
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ties that it should be only for the duration of the
mission.
The evidence is to the contrary. What was in
his mind is not evidence, and cannot be controling.
Certainly, Wm. V. Preece cannot sustain a reversal of the trial court's judgment, based upon an
assumption of what he thought it was, or what his
in tent was, which was not expressed orally or in
writing. It would be outrageous for W. V. Preece to
repudiate a power of attorney by saying it was his
intent, although not expressed in writing or orally,
that a power of attorney was to be for a period of
his mission.
CONCLUSION
It is the position of this plaintiff and respondent that the power of attorney definitely empowered W. J. Preece to execute the guaranty; that in
view of no definite time of duration, and the fact
that there was no agreement between the parties
as to its termination date, that it remained in full
force and effect until terminated by the principal.
This having never been done, the guaranty as executed by W. J. Preece for and on behalf of Wm. V.
Preece, was valid and binding.
It is the further position of this plaintiff and
respondent that there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the trial court's finding and con20
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elusion and judgmen!t. It cannot be contended that
the judgment entered by the trial court does not
find support in the evidence. Without any question
of 'a doubt, the evidence as introduced supports the
judgment of the trial court. !There is evidence directly supporting the trial court's decision and,
therefore, the judgment should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLISTER & KESLER
By
Louis H. Callister
Attorneys for Freed Finance
Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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